Chapter Three

This chapter is focused on the transformations of parties and politicians as they attempt to adapt to evolving electorates and campaign environments. In contemporary politics, traditional links between parties and voters, based on socio-economic and ideological ties, have declined. Mass media have become central to elections.

Parties, accordingly, have continued to transform themselves, first to ‘mass’ or ‘catch-all’ parties, and then to ‘electoral-professional’ or ‘modern cadre’ parties. This has involved relying, less on traditional party structures and ideologies, and more on centralised organisation and the inputs of a wider range of external ‘professionals’ from marketing, media and elsewhere. The questions are: have such developments made parties more responsive to electorates or less? and, how has the process of professionalisation affected parties and their leaders?

.... We might then ask: what are the specific forms of ‘expertise’, or mentalities of government, that contemporary ‘professionalised’ politicians must possess or acquire to be accepted by parties and electorates? Put another way, what kind of individuals are likely to succeed and become leaders of modern electoral-professional parties?

For one thing, such individuals should not have strong ideological positions and be prepared to adapt policy to middle-ground public opinion and broad electorates. Indeed, as several have noted, since the 1960s, there has been considerable convergence in the ideologies and policy stances of major political parties. This has been more pronounced in left-leaning parties, such as Labour and the Democrats (Entman, 1989, 2005, Norris, 1999, Webb and Farrell, 1999, Heath et al., 2000, Curtice, 2005).

Second, leaders should be able to command or manage a rigid hierarchical structure and work well with professional experts and funders from business, marketing and media. This is because, as several have noted (Swanson and Mancini, 1995, Crouch, 2004, Wring, 2005, Hay, 2007), external professionals and centralised hierarchies have become more significant for achieving party goals than traditional party members and local bureaucracies.

Third, successful politicians should have an appealing public personality and be able to project themselves well through the mass media. This makes sense if leader personalities, rather than policy positions, appear increasingly significant to electoral outcomes (Meyer, 2002, Corner and Pels, 2003, Lees, 2005). By the same token there is no advantage gained from having strong policy views, a prior career, particular experience of specific policy areas or of local party politics, connections with ordinary party members or, even a belief in democratic organisational structures.

The Changing Patterns of Party Leadership in the Conservative and Labour Parties

The reshaping of parties and political leaders, and the testing of these ideas, was investigated in the UK case using two methods. First, 36 interviewees (20 politicians, 16 journalists) were asked specifically about the qualities politicians needed to possess in order to progress to the senior levels of their parties. The second method involved an analysis of the biographical details of the 49 members (excluding Peer appointments) of the Labour Cabinet (24) and Conservative Shadow Cabinet (25) of 2007-08. I

n attempting to test possible shifts in the social profile of (Shadow) Cabinet members over time, comparisons were made between entry years and ages. There were 20 members under 50, most of which entered Parliament during or after 2001. 29 members over 50 all entered before 2000. There were several distinct differences between the older and younger cohorts as well as more general trends in evidence over the period (see table 3.1 below). These differences could be said to be reflective of the new professionalisation and media-orientation affecting political party profiles.

The demographic characteristics of both age groups confirm what earlier studies of UK party candidates (Criddle, 1984, Norris and Lovenduski, 1992, 1997a, Childs et al., 2005) have documented. MPs are not demographically-representative of their populations, being predominantly white male graduates from middle and upper middle class backgrounds. Looking at the front-bench profiles here, half went to private, fee-paying schools, almost all went to university – two thirds to Oxford or Cambridge, and a fifth were women. Not much has changed here between generations.

However, more significant changes are detectable when one focuses on degree subjects, work experience, and career progression. Looking at the 20 members of the younger generation (see table 3.1), half did PPE (Politics, Philosophy and Economics) at Oxford, a degree specially conceived for aspiring ‘future leaders’. Four did law and four history/English. Of the older 29, eight did law, seven did history/English, five did politics/European Studies, and two did PPE.

This shift continues when looking at professions prior to entering Parliament. Of the younger generation,11 have been policy advisors/researchers working for politicians, parties and political think-tanks, and ten have worked in journalism and/or public relations. Looking at the older generation, politicians are more likely to have had careers in business/finance (nine), law (eight), university lecturing (six) and trade union/other campaigning (six), something also found in earlier studies (Criddle, 1983, Norris and Lovenduski, 1997b).

The older generation, on average, has also worked twice as long in their profession (15 years) before entering Parliament than the younger generation (7-8 years). In addition, they are much more likely to have worked, paid or unpaid, as a local councillor. Two thirds of those entering before 1990, four tenths of those in the 1990s, and just under a quarter of those in the current decade had been local councillors. The roots to leadership have also changed and become more centralised and fast-tracked. The older generation entered Parliament at an average age of 38 but had to wait just over nine years, in their 47^th year, to reach cabinet level in their careers. The younger generation became MPs at an average age of 35 (see table 3.1) but attained full cabinet status in their 39^th year. They took just under five years to rise to the top level. Those entering Parliament in the current decade took just over three years.

The biographical profile findings were backed up during the interviews. When interviewees were asked specifically about the qualities required for political advancement, over two thirds of politicians and journalists gave the same three answers. The most frequent of these linked promotion to social networks, alliances and loyalties.

Several, unprompted, stated that an important route for aspiring politicians was to work in the office of the party leader, usually as a special advisor, before entering Parliament. The second most common answer given was having good media abilities and/or the ability to maintain good relations with journalists. The third was being noticed and seen to perform well in the House of Commons, most usually in the Chamber. Several noted that for Cabinet promotion, ‘technocratic’ and ‘media’ abilities had overtaken either ‘ideological leaning’ or particular prior professional ‘expertise’ as being significant:

(Jeremy Corbyn MP) I don’t find MPs as a whole necessarily terribly well informed people actually … these days, it’s much more a sort of technocratic political process, which is I think to the detriment of politics …  The ethos of Blair and New Labour is technical and media ability rather than knowledge of a subject. More so than any other leader has ever been

(Simon Heffer, political editor) if you look at the Conservative Cabinet that was in power when I started to write for this newspaper 20 years ago, 1986, it was largely full of people who’d had serious jobs in the real world before going into politics ... so many politicians today have never done anything other than politics. They got elected very young or they became special advisers before that and they’re not people who seem to know very much about the real world ... They have views that are the views of their party, or they have views of their senior that are manufactured for them by special advisers and policy wonks ... the present leader of the Conservative Party [David Cameron] is somebody who is motivated by desire to be Prime Minister and not by a desire to fulfil a programme of political conviction.

Putting these findings together, it could be argued that the newest generation of political leaders are a more ‘professionalised’ class of politicians in the Weberian sense. They are more likely to have a degree, purpose made for political elites (PPE), and prior professional experience in policy-making and/or journalism/public relations. They are more equipped to engage with a policy process but are less knowledgeable about particular policy areas per se.

They are mass media oriented. More contemporary leaders, at an early career stage, have emerged to join the front ranks from social networks that comprise of existing party leaders, think tanks and political journalists. Such shifts also suggest that the new generation are more socially and culturally removed from wider party structures and external professions. Their links to professional occupations (business, education, unions/campaigning groups and law) and local council politics are rather weaker. They do not seem to have had much of an alternative career beyond the parliamentary political sphere and, in many cases, their only career has been within party politics. They have spent rather less time as local councillors and back-bench MPs before joining the senior levels of their parties.

All of this may make them better attuned to party politics, more adept at campaigning, and more able to engage with a range of outside experts and policy briefs. However, at the same time, their life experiences, and links to professions, local politics and ordinary party members, all appear to be rather weaker (see also Dalton and Wattenberg, 2002, Crouch, 2004, Hay, 2007).

The Curious Rise of David Cameron

David Cameron is the archetypal new generation political leader. A case study of successful leadership election bid in 2005 demonstrates this and the arguments of the chapter more concretely ... most journalists and MPs at the time concluded that Cameron could not win and Davis was the most likely winner. Davis had the most media exposure, a clear lead amongst MPs, and was deemed to be ideologically closest to the mass of ordinary members who would cast the final ballot. Ken Clarke, was the most popular amongst general voters and party members but he lacked strong support from fellow MPs and was unlikely to survive the first two parliamentary party ballots. In early September Cameron was only supported by 3% of party members and less than 5% of Conservative MPs (Sunday Times/YouGov, 04.09.05, Times/Populus, 06.09.05).

However, everything appeared to change dramatically during the few days of the conference where all five candidates were due to give speeches. After a very well-received speech by Cameron on the 4^th October, and a poorly-received one by David Davis the next day, Cameron was suddenly catapulted out of obscurity to become the front-runner. Media coverage enthusiastically backed Cameron while criticising Davis. Between the conference speeches and the second MPs’ ballot, two weeks later, 112 pieces in the papers were overtly supportive of Cameron and 52 overtly critical of Davis. By the time of the second Ballot, on the 20^th October, Cameron had gained a strong lead amongst Conservative MPs and was clearly ahead in polls of public and party member opinion. For the next six weeks little changed and, on the 6^th December, Cameron won with more than two thirds of the final vote. For many interviewees, who followed the election closely, the outcome was unexpectedly and completely changed in a one or two day period:

(Tom Bradby, political editor) he was a million to one outsider really, I don’t think he had a cat’s chance in hell of winning. You know, he was a new kid, new boy and no one knew anything about him. He was a nobody. I mean his has been one of the most stunning political rises ever.

Cameron Versus Davis, the New Versus the Old

As argued here Cameron’s success was not as instant or mysterious as many believed. Nor was his rise, as many believe, simply down to a sudden media interest and his telleginic appeal. While he lacked in the obvious measures of political experience, party support and media exposure, his success was based on several less visible advantages. Cameron perfectly fitted the ideal profile typical of the new generation of professionalised UK politicians described above. After graduating in 1988, with an Oxford degree in PPE, he spent six years working closely with many of the Party’s most senior leaders.

This included stints at the CRD (Conservative Research Department), briefing and election strategy work for the Prime Minister John Major, then roles as a special advisor to Norman Lamont in the Treasury and Michael Howard in the Home Office (see Elliott and Hanning, 2007). In effect, although little known in the wider party, Cameron had worked in four of its key power centres and had established social capital at the highest political levels. Similarly, while lacking in media exposure, he had extensive experience in media, PR, and public affairs, and a long-established journalist network. This included media relations work with lobby journalists, while at the CRD and as a political advisor, seven years as Head of Communications, then Director of Corporate Affairs at Carlton Communications (1994-2001), one of the dominant UK television companies of the 1990s.

Such networks and experiences proved instrumental to Cameron’s advance. His connection to Howard, the 2005 party leader, was important as Howard clearly backed Cameron over Davis (mentioned in 44 articles by 25 journalists in May and June). Howard immediately promoted Cameron and several key allies, such as George Osborne, to the Shadow Cabinet. In delaying the contest by several months he allowed time for Osborne and Cameron to develop their campaigns, wider party links, and media profiles. His core campaign team was drawn from similar party policy and media networks. It included several policy and campaign strategists from his CRD and advisor days (George Osborne, Oliver Letwin, Rachel Whetstone), experienced professional journalists (Ed Vaizey, Michael Gove and Boris Johnson), and Steve Hilton, a public relations expert who worked for Saatchi and Saatchi and on the Conservatives’ winning 1992 election campaign. Several interviewees commented on these elements of Cameron’s past as well as his present media knowledge and social networks.

Davis, in contrast to Cameron, had had a 17 year career in business and then worked his way up the party. He had been an MP for 18 years, a junior minister for three years, then a senior party figure for four years. He was well known across the party. However, he did not have the policy, campaign and media experience of Cameron, was thought to be a weak public speaker and did not cultivate journalists (see Montgomery, 2006, Elliott and Hanning, 2007):

(Peter Oborne, journalist, commentator) You can definitely say that David Cameron was part of the media elite in a way that David Davis was not part of that elite. And Cameron was sort of media savvy, fresh faced.

(Iain Dale, political blogger, Davis’s campaign manager 2005) there was a feeling among the media that they were being intimidated by certain members of the Davies leadership team … it all crystallised obviously around the conference when David made the speech

Such differences directly influenced the campaign strategies of the two candidates, as relayed in the interview and content analysis data. Through the Summer period, Cameron and his team proved to be more adept and active than any other group. David Davis got the most media exposure (561 articles) of the four candidates, followed by Cameron (524), Clarke (424), and Fox (279). However, when compared to the earlier six month pre-election period (see table 3.2), it is Clarke and Cameron who have the most significant upward shifts in media exposure. Davis’s total exposure for the campaign period was up by a quarter on the previous six months but Cameron had a nine-fold increase.

Cameron and his allies were also the most proactive as news sources in terms of supplying information to journalists. Cameron, whether cited as a direct or indirect source, was the most active individual, with 121 source references. He wrote more articles and/or was the subject of an interview piece, more than anyone else. Cameron’s allies, were cited more than any other candidate’s, with 104 source references. Davis was personally cited 111 times and his allies 98 times. This activity by Cameron was clearly noticed by those who regularly reported political affairs:

(Daisy McAndrew, political editor) There had been a number of [Cameron] speeches that hadn’t really made it onto the telly … we all go to many, many, many events that don’t end up on the telly … But, of course, it informs our opinion … so a lot of journalists had been following his progress for quite a while, but hadn’t really talked about it much in their newspapers or on the telly because they hadn’t had much of an opportunity.

Davis’s campaign was focused on maintaining his strong support amongst back-bench MPs and appealing to traditional party members. He made little additional effort with lobby correspondents, something noted by some of the interviewees and in some press accounts of the time (e.g., Kavanagh, 28.05.05, Sylvester, 13.06.05, Jones and Helm, 7.10.05). In contrast, Cameron’s individual presentation attempted to appeal to the wider electorate beyond the Conservative Party. He made several approaches to left-leaning journalists and publications, and consciously positioning himself as the ‘heir to Blair’. All this was reflected in the content analysis.

Some 70 articles drew comparisons between David Cameron and Tony Blair, with many likening David Cameron and George Osborne to the young Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. While being positioned as a moderniser from the centre-left of the party he offered little in the way of clear policy statements. Several interviewees, as well as much press coverage, regularly referred to him as ‘policy-lite’ in his public statements (see also Montgomery, 2006). The content analysis also recorded the audiences addressed or mentioned in articles. In Davis’s case, 67 pieces mention MPs, 68 party members, but only 19 general voters. For Cameron, 27 mention MPs, 64 party members, and 78 general voters.

Clearly, throughout the Summer period, Cameron had done more than any other candidate to increase his levels of media exposure, journalist contact and positioning near the electoral centre ground. At the end of September what he was still lacking was television exposure and public recognition. His ability to potentially establish a ‘para-social relationship’ (Horton and Whol, 1993, see chapter six) with the wider public, party members and general voters, beyond Westminster had yet to be tested. Three particular events changed that and encouraged the relatively small parliamentary networks of Conservative MPs and journalists towards a Cameron endorsement. The first of these was Cameron’s official campaign launch to journalists on the 29^th September. The launch was chosen especially to follow Davis’s own launch earlier on the same day and contrasted strongly in its presentation and target audience. Days later, Cameron’s impact on the elite group of lobby correspondents was becoming evident. William Rees-Mogg (02.10.05) wrote in the Mail on Sunday that ‘Most journalists thought that David Cameron had a much better launch than David Davis. David Cameron has some of Blair’s skills.’ The launches were clearly remembered by several journalist interviewees who commented on them without prompting. As one recounted:

(Gary Gibbon, political editor) we went to David Davis’ first, and it was in this traditional wood panelled room with lots of men in suits. David Davis is not intellectually self confident enough to take more than three questions.  It was smug and presumptuous … And then we went down the road and we went into Cameron’s launch, and they’d made some effort with the production and there it was nicely lit, nice stage, young people coming onto the stage saying this is why I support this man … They’d made the whole thing look like a brasserie … on comes Cameron, he talks without notes, and is intellectually and self confident enough to take virtually every question in the room. And everybody felt that difference and … the lobby slightly talked within itself

The second, significant event was a BBC Newsnight piece, broadcast on the 3^rd of October, the eve of Cameron’s speech. In the piece, Frank Luntz, a political consultant, had organised a focus group of potential Conservative voters. Clips of the five candidates speaking in public were presented to the audience and David Cameron got the most favourable response. One week later, during the conference, the Cameron team sent round DVDs, which included this piece, to all Conservative MPs and several journalists. This in itself drew some favourable commentary (e.g., Hurst, 11.10.05, Aaronovitch, 04.10.05). The third event was the conference speeches where, once again, the mediated performance skills of the five candidates were going to be directly compared. In almost all newsprint and interview accounts, Cameron’s speech was deemed to have made a strong impact but was not considered the best of the five. However, several stated that broadcast coverage was particularly enthusiastic about Cameron and fairly negative about Davis the next day.

Over a five month period Cameron had drawn on his senior political and journalistic networks, and significant campaign, lobbying and media experience, to move from last to first amongst the candidates. The new Conservative political generation had usurped its, older, more traditional rivals. The contrast in the profiles, abilities and appeals of the two candidates was summed up by David Blunkett MP:

David Davis did much better on the Today Programme that same day than David Cameron, but he undoubtedly flopped in his formal platform speech … And, therefore, the new benchmark was different to the old one. Instead of it being experience, knowledge, hands-on in Parliament, dealing with big issues, gravitas … the new benchmark [was] the presentable, the fresh, the new, the ability to ditch policy and image, and that became then the judgement that had to be made. So, it didn’t just change perceptions about the two individuals, it changed the terms under which the leadership campaign had been run.

Conclusion

Cameron, in almost all ways, possesses the ideal profile of the modern, aspiring party leader. Young, white, male, an Oxbridge graduate with a PPE degree, lengthy policy, campaign, media and public relations experience, a network of contacts that includes party leaders and political journalists, and a willingness to adapt ideology to political circumstances. His experience and contacts fed through to his electoral strategy. In contrast to Davis’s focus on MPs and traditional party members, Cameron concentrated on his links with the party elite and lobby journalists. He appealed to the wider electorate by avoiding strong policy statements and with media-friendly presentations. The televised speeches, as well as less publicised earlier events, demonstrated that Cameron was far more capable than Davis of generating positive media coverage and gaining the support of centre ground and swing voters. Journalists and MPs picked this up and relayed it to watching party members.

Cameron has continued to campaign successfully and, at the time of writing, is on course to win the 2010 election. As with Tony Blair’s 1997 success, Cameron’s ideological motivations and long-term policy goals remain vague. There is nothing to suggest in this account that Cameron is any more out of touch with ordinary citizens than any other party leader. But then, there is nothing is his profile or history to suggest that he has any experience or contacts beyond the elite political cadres that currently lead many parties. A wealthy background, Eton and Oxbridge education, and continuous employment within the party-media-public affairs sphere of UK politics.