The Godson approach to political warfare: Part 2 PDF Print E-mail

Tom Griffin, 14 September, 2007

Blocking the back-channels from Ireland to the Middle East

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Martin McGuiness
The claim that Sinn Fein’s Martin McGuinness was an MI6 agent must rank as one of the more intriguing intelligence stories of recent years, but a careful examination of the episode may reveal more about disinformation techniques than infiltration of the IRA.

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Godson on Trimble
The accusation was originally made in May 2006 by an ex-soldier known by the pseudonym Martin Ingram. A former member of the British Army’s Force Research Unit, Ingram had established some credibility because of his role in identifying Freddie Scappaticci as Stakeknife – a key informer within the IRA.

A little-noticed aspect of the story was the apparent corroboration provided by Dean Godson, who is best known in Ireland for a well-regarded biography of David Trimble and for his scepticism about power-sharing with republicans.

In an obituary for Fr Denis Faul, a prominent Irish priest and human rights activist, Godson wrote that Faul “would have been unsurprised by allegations that Martin McGuinness was a British agent: he had claimed as much to me more than five years ago.”

Ingram’s contention is based on an unpublished document which he claims is a record of Martin McGuinness and an MI6 handler plotting the IRA’s human bomb attack campaign of 1990. Both the Sunday Times and Ireland’s Sunday Tribune were shown transcripts of this document, but neither was permitted to see the original.

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Roy Godson's book
Both papers were skeptical about the material, which the Sunday Times described as ‘a fabrication.’ Such a forgery would be consistent with the covert action techniques described by Roy Godson in his book Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards.

“People will believe what they want to,” Godson writes. “Disinformation is unlikely to have much impact on targets not predisposed to a certain belief. Therefore the primary consideration of the forger is to identify and play to predispositions; worrying about the quality or plausibility of the disinformation comes second.”

Who would be predisposed to the belief that Martin McGuinness is an MI6 agent? One obvious answer is dissident republicans, who see the Good Friday Agreement as a betrayal.

This could be seen as consistent with Godson’s suggestion that “covert action practitioners can create dissension within the ranks of terrorists and their supporters. For instance, by planting evidence that faction A is in contact with the police, covert practitioners may convince faction B that faction A is plotting its demise.”

However, if Ingram’s allegations were to be believed, the implications would reach far beyond Irish republicanism. In many ways, the most startling element of his allegations is the suggestion that MI6 was involved in planning attacks on the British security forces.

MI6, formally the Secret Intelligence Service, has played a distinctive role in the history of Northern Ireland. It was the pre-eminent intelligence service in the North from 1970 until 1973, when it lost its position to MI5 in a bureaucratic power struggle.

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Smear: The Wilson plot
“From 1971 onwards, SIS officers came to believe that the Provisional Irish Republican Army was a political organisation which could be outwitted, not merely a terrorist organisation which must be destroyed,” authors Stephen Dorril and Robin Ramsay report in their book, Smear: Wilson and the Secret State.  “After the failure of the 1972 talks, however, this faction of the state was in retreat. During 1973, the hard-liners in HQ Northern Ireland and in London gradually gained the upper hand and took the final step of expanding the category of 'the enemy' to include Westminster politicians - and not just those in the Labour Party.”

This is a reference to the Clockwork Orange episode, in which Army Information Officer Colin Wallace was used to spread disinformation – by showing forged documents to selected journalists.

MI6 retained one key function from the mid-1970s onwards, providing a discreet back-channel for communication between the British Government and the IRA. This link helped to produce the IRA ceasefire of 1975, an abortive deal during the hunger strikes of the early 1980s, and ultimately provided one of the roots of the 1990s peace process.

Some of those involved in this behind-the scenes effort have since sought to apply their experience to other conflicts. MI6 officer Alistair Crooke went on to mediate in negotiations that led to a Hamas ceasefire in 2003. He is currently a director of Conflicts Forum which advocates dialogue with Hamas, Hezbollah, and other Islamist groups.

“The EU should heed the words of Efraim Halevy, former adviser to Ariel Sharon and a former Mossad head, “ Crooke wrote in a 2006 article for Prospect magazine. “He recently criticised Israel for insisting that Hamas first recognise the Jewish state as a precondition for any discussion. Halevy argued rather that Israel should recognise Hamas first. He predicted that in so doing, ‘we will be seeing things we have not seen before’–an apparent allusion to talks between Israel and Hamas. That would be a good start.’”

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Dean Godson
The following edition of Prospect featured an article by Dean Godson, under the revealing title ‘Gone Native’ that heavily criticised MI6 officers like Crooke and Michael Oatley, who was for many years the key figure in the back channel to the IRA.

“Crooke and Oatley are the products of late-imperial British defeatism: an era when the main issue was the terms on which to exit the colonies,” Godson argued. “That is why the self-confident liberal interventionism of the American neoconservatives poses such a stark challenge. But America, whose decline is far from assured, should tread carefully before embracing the mindset of a country at a different phase in its existence.”

The neoconservative interventionism is exemplified by figures like Deputy National Security Advisor Elliot Abrams, who has opposed moves towards a peace process with Syria, and has played a key role in isolating Hamas after its victory in the 2006 Palestinian elections. Like Roy Godson, Abrams is a veteran of the Iran/Contra affair.

The Irish example has assumed some significance in Middle East policy debates as a challenge to this counter-insurgency approach. Attempting to undermine that analogy by discrediting the Irish peace process would be quite consistent with the neoconservative penchant for covert action.

 

Part 3 of this series follows shortly...