Harvard Political Review, Gabriel Unger, 1/8/2008

On June 8, 1789, James Madison presented the Congress with twelve proposed amendments to the Constitution, ten of which would become the Bill of Rights. The first of these amendments asserted that Congress would make no law prohibiting the right of the people to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. One wonders, then, if Madison would be pleased with the alacrity with which this clause has been embraced. Washington D.C. is now home to over 17,000 federal lobbyists striving to influence legislators to support or reject legislation or, in some cases, to propose entirely new legislation. The extent of their power over congressional outcomes is largely hidden from the American public, limiting open discussion about the consequences of their activity for the national interest.

Yet a spate of recent lobbyist-related scandals has captured the attention of the public and engendered questions about the breadth and depth of the influence that lobbyists enjoy on Capitol Hill. A federal investigation into lobbyist Jack Abramoff and his efforts on behalf of casino gambling interests revealed a systematic pattern of campaign donations and illegal gift giving in exchange for favorable votes on certain pieces of legislation. On Jan. 3, 2006, Abramoff pled guilty to felony counts on conspiracy, fraud, and tax evasion; a series of elected officials, lobbyists, and congressional aides were implicated in a scandal that illustrated the degree to which lobbyists have integrated themselves into the fabric of Washington D.C. On the strength of campaign donations and personal relationships with members of Congress, such lobbyists not only wield influence on the Hill but are effectively using their power to resist any efforts to diminish their role.

Inside the Industry
In the wake of the Abramoff scandal, former Rep. Tom DeLay (R-Texas) stepped down from his position as House majority leader and did not run for re-election. Congress then passed the Lobbying Transparency and Accountability Act of 2006, which forbids elected representatives and their staff from accepting gifts or meals from lobbyists and mandates disclosure on campaign donations. Most agree, however, that the legislation passed to check the influence of lobbying is at best a nuisance for lobbyists and not a serious threat to their work. When asked if these laws have had any effect on the nature of lobbying, Dennis Thompson, a professor at the Harvard Kennedy School, noted that “the steak houses are doing less business, but otherwise not much.” The millions of dollars that the lobbying industry spends every year to influence legislators has been re-routed but not eliminated. It has instead taken the form of fundraisers, charitable activities and industry-sponsored seminars, all of which serve to funnel money from the private interests the lobbyists represent to the coffers of elected officials.

Yet to ban the social gatherings that permit lobbyists and elected officials to mingle would be ineffective for the same reason that the Lobbying Transparency and Accountability Act failed to produce meaningful reform. The law failed because it did not address the two sources from which lobbyists derive their disproportionate influence: money and personal relationships. Professor Stephen Walt of the Harvard Kennedy School explained that the biggest obstacle in overcoming the influence of lobbyists “is the well-entrenched role that money plays in U.S. elections, which gives various interest groups an easy way to influence the behavior of politicians. This will not change until there is serious campaign finance reform, such as a complete federal funding of elections.” Complete federal funding would certainly signal a death knell to the lobbying industry, but it is highly unlikely that it could muster sufficient support to pass Congress.

The second source of lobbying influence is the web of close personal relationships many lobbyists have with members of Congress. In fact, many lobbyists were once in Congress themselves. A report by the watchdog group Public Citizen found that since 1998, 43 percent of the 198 members of the House who left office registered to become lobbyists, as did 50 percent of departing senators. This particularly potent brand of lobbyist has access to the House and Senate floor, and to members-only gymnasiums and restaurants; in the absence of stricter revolving-door prohibitions, these super-lobbyists have complete access to the Capitol in their efforts to sway legislators and advance the agendas of their clients.

Little Chance of Reform
The 2008 election cycle has seen its fair share of presidential candidates condemning the power of the lobbying industry. Yet even these candidates have connections with corporate interests. Sen. Hillary Clinton (D-N.Y.) openly defended her policy of accepting money from lobbyists and was loudly booed for arguing at a convention of progressive bloggers that “a lot of those lobbyists, whether you like it or not, represent real Americans.” The crowd then cheered Sen. Barack Obama (D-Ill.) when he pointed out that the lobbyists are hardly spending millions of dollars out of a sense of altruism or patriotic duty. Yet though the Obama campaign refuses to take money from lobbyists, Obama spent a morning last fall in the Miami offices of billion-dollar lobbying firm Greenberg Traurig, for which Jack Abramoff worked, raising money from employees and video-conferencing with Greenberg Traurig branches across the country.

The distinction between lobbying money and corporate money has proved to be a fine line, and Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) can attest to the nuances of it. In 1987, an Arizona real estate developer brought McCain along with him on vacations to the Bahamas and then enlisted him to hold back regulators while the developer used federally insured deposits for risky investments. The financier was sent to prison, and the careers of three senators were ended. McCain escaped with a reprimand.

But whether or not McCain manages to make it from the brink of political ruin to the White House, the attitude of the next President toward lobbying is unlikely to be significant. Any serious scaling-back of the influence of lobbying would have to involve fundamental campaign finance reform. This reform would, paradoxically, have to pass through two houses of legislators who are to varying degrees influenced by the very lobbyists the reform would target, making such reform highly improbable. John Mearsheimer, the University of Chicago professor known for his controversial study of the Israel lobby, told the HPR that while the only effective way to limit the power of lobbyists is campaign finance reform, there is no political will to do so, and such reform would have “no chance in my lifetime of making it through the legislature.”

As long as serious campaign reform is trapped in this legislative Catch-22, lobbyists and their clients will continue to exert serious influence on the legislative process of the federal government, under the tenuous banner of the first amendment, for years to come.